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FULL COST IN TRANSLATION:
AWARDING EXPERT WITNESS FEES
IN COPYRIGHT LITIGATION
Nicholas Vennekotter*
When deciding whether to bring or defend against copyright infringement
claims, the cost of litigation plays a critical role in the minds of potential
litigants. The cost of retaining experts, particularly, is a large factor in this
calculus. Although U.S. courts generally require each party to cover the cost
of their own legal fees during litigation, the Copyright Act of 1976 permits
courts, in their discretion, to allow the prevailing party to recover “full
costs.” Yet, the language “full costs” is considered ambiguous, which leads
to inconsistent awards of costs among the appellate courts. The circuits
disagree whether the Copyright Act merely allows parties to recover modest
costs, such as docket fees and witness travel expenses, or to recover more
substantial costs, like expert witness fees. Accordingly, the level of discretion
afforded to a court can essentially be the difference between an award that
includes nontaxable costs in the tens of millions of dollars and an award that
does not include nontaxable costs at all. Recently, in Oracle USA, Inc. v.
Rimini Street, Inc., the judgment awarded to the prevailing party included
an additional $12 million in costs because it was brought in a circuit that
allows awards of nontaxable costs under the Copyright Act.
This Note concludes that the Copyright Act, as it stands, does not allow a
court to award expert witness fees to a prevailing party. However, given the
objectively important need for expert testimony in copyright litigation, this
Note argues that Congress should amend the Copyright Act to allow for the
shifting of expert fees at courts’ discretion.
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INTRODUCTION
A critical issue in copyright law is finding the proper balance between a
creator’s property rights to his work and the public’s access to that work.1
To equally promote these competing interests within copyright litigation, fee
shifting2 is applied without favoritism to either a prevailing plaintiff or a

1. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989).
2. Fee-shifting, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The transfer of
responsibility for paying fees, esp[ecially] attorney’s fees, from the prevailing party to the
losing party.”). For a discussion of competing philosophies regarding fee-shifting, see infra
notes 14–30 and accompanying text.
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prevailing defendant.3 Because legal fees can greatly outweigh damages that
a plaintiff may recover, the opportunity to recover costs can be a decisive
factor when a plaintiff decides whether to file suit to enforce its copyrights.4
Defendants too must grapple with the potential costs of litigation when
deciding whether to defend against a copyright infringement claim or instead
seek a quick settlement.5
Under 17 U.S.C. § 505, courts may exercise discretion in awarding parties
“full costs” in copyright cases.6 At the very least, full costs include taxable
costs7 under Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are
enumerated in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821.8 However, circuit courts of
appeals are split on whether nontaxable costs,9 which are not included within
the guidelines of §§ 1920 and 1821, are nonetheless recoverable under § 505
due to its broad language: “full costs.”10
This Note examines whether expert witness fees should be awarded as
nontaxable costs to prevailing parties in copyright infringement cases. This
Note concludes that courts should have discretion to award expert witness
fees to parties as recoverable costs in copyright litigation. Given the need for
expert witnesses in copyright litigation, allowing parties to recover expert
fees maintains the balance between creators’ property rights and the public’s
access to works. Because the U.S. Supreme Court’s current precedent does
not allow for a judicial solution to address this need, Congress should amend
§ 505 to allow parties to recover expert fees in copyright litigation.
Part I provides relevant background regarding fee shifting in copyright,
awards of costs, the language of § 505, and fee shifting in other intellectual
property statutes. Part II examines the Copyright Act and potential remedies
3. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994) (rejecting the dual standard in
favor of equitable discretion to both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants). For more
information on the “dual standard,” see infra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
4. See Sandra Aistars, Devlin Harline & Mark Schultz, Copyright Principles and
Priorities to Foster a Creative Digital Marketplace, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 769, 788 (2016).
5. See James Trigg, Bakari Brock & Andrew Pequignot, A Question of Cost, COPYRIGHT
WORLD, May 2007, at 13, 14, https://www.kilpatricktownsend.com/~/media/Files/
articles/AQuestionofCostRecentDecisionsontheCopyrightAct.ashx [https://perma.cc/T74AE6RP].
6. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012); infra note 52 and accompanying text.
7. Taxable Cost, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A litigation-related
expense that the prevailing party is entitled to as part of the court’s award.”). Taxable costs
are not limited to costs that can have a tax imposed on them.
8. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (characterizing the expenses generally
covered as taxable costs).
9. This Note focuses primarily on expert fees as nontaxable costs. For a brief description
of other nontaxable costs that may also be awarded, see infra note 82 and accompanying text.
10. Compare Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 885
(9th Cir. 2005) (permitting an award of expert witness fees after finding that to ignore the
word “full” would fail to give every word in § 505 meaning), and InvesSys, Inc. v. McGrawHill Cos., 369 F.3d 16, 19, 23 (1st Cir. 2004) (permitting an award of costs that included
computer-aided legal research), with Artisan Contractors Ass’n of Am. v. Frontier Ins. Co.,
275 F.3d 1038, 1039–40 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding that expert witness fees were not taxable as
costs because § 505 lacks any clear reference to witness fees), and Pinkham v. Camex, Inc.,
84 F.3d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding that the “full costs” language did not evidence
congressional intent to award costs under § 505 differently from costs under other statutes).

1724

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

for costly copyright litigation. Part III illustrates the conflict among the
circuit courts regarding whether the Copyright Act allows for expert witness
fees to be awarded as costs. Part IV concludes that, while the Copyright Act
does not presently allow courts to award expert witness fees, the Act should
be amended to allow for such awards.
I. THE FRAMEWORK FOR AWARDING COSTS IN COPYRIGHT LAW
In copyright law, a network of statutes and case law governs appropriate
awards of costs. Although the extent of awardable costs is generally clear
within federal law, the Copyright Act’s fee-shifting provision has led to
confusion among courts regarding what may be awarded in copyright
infringement cases.11 A notable strand of this confusion is whether
prevailing parties are entitled to expert costs—often a significant component
of litigation expenses.12 Part I.A examines fee shifting and its purpose in
both U.S. courts generally and in copyright law. Part I.B discusses awards
of costs as a form of fee shifting, expert fees as a significant cost in copyright
law, and what is required to allow for the shifting of expert fees. Part I.C
examines the ambiguous language of “full costs” within the Copyright Act’s
fee-shifting provision, 17 U.S.C. § 505. Part I.D reviews the shifting of costs
within other areas of intellectual property law: the Lanham Act and the
Patent Act.
A. Fee Shifting in U.S. Courts and Its Evolution Within Copyright Law
In U.S. courts, fee shifting is generally not permitted absent statutory
authority stating otherwise.13 The Copyright Act grants such authority and
allows courts to shift full costs and attorney’s fees to both prevailing
plaintiffs and defendants.
1. Fee Shifting in U.S. Courts
Two rules govern competing fee-shifting philosophies.14 The English rule
requires the losing party to pay the prevailing party’s legal fees.15 In contrast,
the American rule requires each party to pay its own legal fees absent a
statute or contract providing otherwise.16

11. See infra Part III (discussing the circuit split regarding the permissible scope of awards
of costs under § 505).
12. See infra Part III.
13. Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys’ Fees for Abuses of the Judicial System, 61 N.C. L.
REV. 613, 613 (1983).
14. See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the American Rule
on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts, 98 CORNELL L. REV.
327, 328–29 (2013).
15. Id. at 329.
16. Mallor, supra note 13, at 613.
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Federal fee-shifting statutes present variations of these two philosophies.17
Such statutes authorize an award of fees to the prevailing party.18 The
Supreme Court defines prevailing parties as parties that obtain “enforceable
judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent decrees.”19 Fee-shifting
statutes can allow for the recovery of both costs and attorney’s fees: “costs”
refers to expenditures that the attorney pays to third parties to carry out a
case, and “attorney’s fees” refers to the compensation an attorney earns for
legal services rendered.20 Thus, fee-shifting statutes that permit courts to
require one party to pay another party’s fees constitute a significant departure
from the longstanding American rule.21
Absent fee-shifting statutes, courts tend to favor the American rule because
it discourages abusive clients and their attorneys from instituting
unrestrained litigation or unreasonable fees, it prevents those with
meritorious yet small claims from shying away from litigation to avoid being
burdened with their opponents’ fees, and it avoids burdensome judicial
administration resulting from litigation fees.22 Nonetheless, the English rule
also can provide benefits because it potentially deters frivolous or
nonmeritorious lawsuits, reduces parties’ incentives to drive up their
adversaries’ costs, and reduces the expected marginal costs of expenditures
on a party’s attorney.23
Despite the common law’s adherence to the American rule, the Supreme
Court has reaffirmed three major exceptions to the American rule that stem
from common law: the common fund doctrine, the common benefit doctrine,
and the bad faith doctrine.24 Under the common fund doctrine, attorneys “are
entitled to reasonable compensation for their professional services in
establishing a lien, in behalf of the unsecured creditors.”25 Under the
common benefit doctrine—a derivative of the common fund doctrine—“a
litigant or a lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons
other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from
the fund as a whole.”26 And under the bad faith doctrine, “a federal court

17. See Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 14, at 329.
18. Prevailing Party, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A party in whose favor
a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded . . . .”).
19. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532
U.S. 598, 604 (2001) (“[E]nforceable judgments on the merits and court-ordered consent
decrees create the ‘material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties’ necessary to
permit an award of attorney’s fees.” (quoting Tex. State Teachers Ass’n v. Garland Indep.
Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792–93 (1989))).
20. See infra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
21. See Mallor, supra note 13, at 613–14.
22. Mary Jo Hudson, Comment, Expert Witness Fees as Taxable Costs in Federal
Courts—the Exceptions and the Rule, 55 U. CIN. L. REV. 1207, 1211 (1987).
23. Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 14, at 335–36.
24. Samuel R. Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Fees: What Is “Reasonable”?, 126 U.
PA. L. REV. 281, 295 (1977).
25. Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 127 (1884).
26. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980).
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may award counsel fees to a successful party when his opponent has acted
‘in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.’”27
An approach that relies on bad faith as a prerequisite for an award to a
prevailing plaintiff or defendant has been criticized as potentially
disadvantaging defendants.28 The “inquiry into a non-prevailing plaintiff’s
culpability goes solely to the conduct of the litigation,” whereas the “inquiry
concerning a non-prevailing defendant emphasizes, in addition or in the
alternative, the underlying infringing activities.”29 Accordingly, defendants
will be found culpable much more often under this inquiry.30
Although most fee-shifting statutes do not distinguish between prevailing
plaintiffs and prevailing defendants, the Supreme Court has held that a dual
standard applies to parties suing under several civil rights statutes.31 Under
this dual standard, prevailing plaintiffs are awarded fees whereas prevailing
defendants are not.32 This seeks to encourage potential plaintiffs to bring
meritorious claims that vindicate the public interest, such as civil rights
claims, without deterring those plaintiffs with the possibility of having to pay
a prevailing defendant’s fees.33
However, the dual standard does not apply to fee shifting under the
Copyright Act. In Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,34 the Court held that, unlike civil
rights claims, defendants with meritorious defenses to copyright claims
“should be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent that plaintiffs are
encouraged to litigate meritorious claims of infringement.”35 This is because
a successful defense of a creative work could lead to its increased public
exposure, which would allow for further creativity.36 Thus, successful
copyright infringement claims and defenses can further the goals of the
Copyright Act.37 Because copyright law attempts to balance creators’

27. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (quoting 6 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL
PRACTICE ¶ 54.77 (2d ed. 1972)).
28. Peter Jaszi, 505 and All That—the Defendant’s Dilemma, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
107, 118–19 (1992).
29. Id. at 118.
30. See id. at 118–19.
31. See Indep. Fed’n of Flight Attendants v. Zipes, 491 U.S. 754, 758–59 (1989) (holding
that the dual standard applied to parties suing under several civil rights statutes despite the
statutes not distinguishing between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants). For example,
regarding 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3, the Court noted that this constraint was “necessary to carry
out Congress’ intention that individuals injured by racial discrimination act as ‘“private
attorney[s] general,” vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority.’”
Id. at 759 (alteration in original) (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402
(1968) (per curiam)). This rationale was also applied to the Emergency School Aid Act, 20
U.S.C. § 1617, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). See id.
at 758–59.
32. See id. at 759.
33. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-970, AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES BY FEDERAL COURTS
AND FEDERAL AGENCIES 11 (2009).
34. 510 U.S. 517 (1994).
35. Id. at 527.
36. See id.
37. Id.
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property rights with the public’s access to a work,38 § 505 allows for fee
shifting without favoritism toward either a prevailing plaintiff or prevailing
defendant to equally promote these interests.39
2. The Evolution of Fee Shifting Within Copyright Law
Today, the Copyright Act permits fee shifting pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505,
which provides:
In any civil action under [the Copyright Act], the court in its discretion may
allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United
States or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the
court may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as
part of the costs.40

Despite its simple language, § 505 has undergone minor changes with each
iteration of the Copyright Act.
The Copyright Act of 1790 was the first federal copyright statute enacted
in the United States.41 The 1790 Act’s stated purpose was to encourage
“learning, by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors
and proprietors of such copies.”42 At the time, copyright protection was not
nearly as expansive as it is today.43 The 1790 Act lacked any provision
allowing awards of costs or attorney’s fees to a prevailing party.44
The Copyright Act of 1831 was the first revision permitting plaintiffs to
recover costs.45 It stated “[t]hat, in all recoveries under [the Act], either for
damages, forfeitures, or penalties, full costs shall be allowed thereon.”46 This
language required courts to award costs without giving them discretion. This
iteration did not mention attorney’s fees as a possible award.47
The Copyright Act of 1909, however, added attorney’s fees as another
recoverable item.48 Leaving the phrase “full costs” untouched, it provided
“[t]hat in all actions, suits, or proceedings under [the Act], except when
38. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
40. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012) (emphasis added).
41. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
42. Id. In 1984, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the stated purpose of the 1790 Act. See
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
43. The 1790 Act provided for an initial copyright term of only fourteen years and limited
this protection to books, charts, and maps. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. at 124.
Today, copyright protection is much broader and allows for copyright terms of potentially
ninety-five years because it extends protection nonexclusively to literary works; musical
works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic, and
sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and
architectural works. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§§ 2.02–.03 (rev. ed. 2018).
44. See generally Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124.
45. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 12, 4 Stat. 436, 438–39.
46. Id.
47. This was not unique to the Copyright Act at this time: no federal statute permitted
attorney’s fees from 1800 to 1853. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee
Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1576 (1993).
48. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 40, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084.
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brought by or against the United States or any officer thereof, full costs shall
be allowed, and the court may award to the prevailing party a reasonable
attorney’s fee as part of the costs.”49 Unlike costs, which remained
mandatory, attorney’s fees were permissive and awarded at the court’s
discretion.50
The modern copyright statute, the Copyright Act of 1976, made the award
of costs permissive as well.51 Section 505 now provides that costs, like
attorney’s fees, should be granted at the discretion of the court.52 This was a
“substantial departure” from the previous Act,53 under which courts routinely
recognized that an award of full costs was mandatory.54 Under the 1976 Act,
only the prevailing party may recover attorney’s fees, whereas costs may be
awarded to either the prevailing party or the losing party where a losing party
is forced to go to trial after offering to consent to judgment.55
In short, an award of costs was recognized and made mandatory under the
1831 Act and remained so for nearly a century and a half until the 1976 Act
made an award of costs permissive.56
B. Awards of Costs
Costs are distinct from attorney’s fees,57 and fee-shifting statutes often
draw a distinction between these two items.58 Attorney’s fees are the
compensation an attorney earns for legal services.59 Costs are the
expenditures that the attorney pays to third parties to carry out a case.60 The
extent of these expenditures to third parties that a prevailing party may be
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
52. Id.
53. Quinto v. Legal Times of Wash., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 579, 580 (D.D.C. 1981).
54. See, e.g., Simon & Flynn, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 513 F.2d 832, 835 (2d Cir. 1975); Edward
B. Marks Music Corp. v. Foullon, 171 F.2d 905, 908 (2d Cir. 1949); Krafft v. Cohen, 38 F.
Supp. 1022, 1023 (E.D. Pa. 1941). But see Rosette v. Rainbo Record Mfg. Corp., 354 F. Supp.
1183, 1195 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (ignoring the mandatory fee-shifting provision); Sweet Music,
Inc. v. Melrose Music Corp., 189 F. Supp. 655, 659 (S.D. Cal. 1960) (same); Harrington v.
Mure, 186 F. Supp. 655, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (same); Vernon v. Sam S. & Lee Shubert, Inc.,
220 F. 694, 696 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) (refusing to award costs where the lawsuit was brought in
good faith).
55. See, e.g., Warner Bros. v. Dae Rim Trading, Inc., 877 F.2d 1120, 1128–29 (2d Cir.
1989) (denying attorney’s fees but affirming costs where a vexatious plaintiff forced a
defendant to trial after the defendant offered to consent to judgment).
56. See 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 43, § 14.09.
57. See, e.g., People v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 196, 199 (Ct. App. 2012)
(“Attorney fees and the expenses of litigation, whether termed costs, disbursements, outlays,
or something else, are mutually exclusive.”); Johnson v. Jarvis, 107 So. 3d 428, 429 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2012) (“Costs and attorney’s fees are not one and the same.”).
58. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012); 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–285
(2012).
59. Attorney’s Fee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The charge to a client
for services performed for the client, such as an hourly fee, a flat fee, or a contingent fee.”).
60. Cost, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The expenses of litigation,
prosecution, or other legal transaction, esp[ecially] those allowed in favor of one party against
the other.”).
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entitled to recover in copyright infringement cases is a subject of
controversy.61 Although courts have general authority to award costs to
prevailing parties, expert witness fees—which are often crucial in copyright
litigation62—may not be awarded without explicit statutory authorization.63
1. Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
“[u]nless a federal statute, [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], or a court
order provides otherwise, costs—other than attorney’s fees—should be
allowed to the prevailing party.”64 The Supreme Court has noted that the
language of this Rule codifies a presumption that all prevailing parties are
entitled to costs.65 Still, the Court made clear that the word “should” suggests
that, absent statutory authority providing otherwise, awards of costs
ultimately lie within a trial judge’s discretion.66
Although the Court has not articulated the exact factors that should permit
an award of attorney’s fees to prevailing parties in copyright litigation, it has
made clear that bad faith67 is not the only condition that will permit such
Frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness,
an award.68
compensation, and deterrence constitute nonexclusive factors courts may
consider in deciding whether to award costs and attorney’s fees, so long as
the award is “faithful to the purposes of the Copyright Act.”69
2. Taxable Costs
“Costs” is a term of art that is not synonymous with expenses.70 Litigants
incur a variety of expenses throughout the course of litigation—from modest
sums like filing fees to enormous sums spent for attorneys and expert
witnesses.71 Still, prevailing parties are not entitled to recover all of these
expenses.72
Presumptive awards of costs permitted under Rule 54(d) are those costs
that Congress has defined as taxable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920.73 Section 1920
provides:

61. See infra Part III (discussing the circuit split regarding the permissible scope of awards
of costs under § 505).
62. See infra Part II.A.2.
63. See infra Part I.B.4.
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1).
65. Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 377 (2013) (holding that 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(a)(3) did not displace discretion to award costs under Rule 54(d)(1)).
66. Id.
67. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
68. See Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 532 n.18 (1994).
69. Id. at 534 n.19.
70. 10 JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.103 (Daniel R. Coquillette
et al. eds., 3d ed. 2018).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441 (1987).
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A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may tax as costs the
following:
(1) Fees of the clerk and marshal;
(2) Fees for printed or electronically recorded transcripts necessarily
obtained for use in the case;
(3) Fees and disbursements for printing and witnesses;
(4) Fees for exemplification and the costs of making copies of any
materials where the copies are necessarily obtained for use in the case;
(5) Docket fees under section 1923 of this title;
(6) Compensation of court appointed experts, compensation of
interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation
services under section 1828 of this title.

The witness fees described in § 1920(3) are further defined in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1821.74
The Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821 “define the
full extent of a federal court’s power to shift litigation costs absent express
statutory authority to go further.”75 Therefore, absent a statutory provision
providing otherwise, federal courts generally cannot award additional costs
beyond those enumerated in § 1920 and § 1821.76 Courts cannot supersede
the limits these sections impose without “plain evidence of congressional
intent to supersede those sections.”77
Expert witnesses, just like any other witnesses, are entitled to the fees
defined under § 1821.78 However, trained and experienced experts with
valuable time, talents, and specialized knowledge generally require
compensation beyond what § 1821 covers.79 Accordingly, a substantial
majority of expert witness fees accrued by litigants in copyright infringement
cases are not covered as taxable costs.80
3. Expert Witness Fees as Nontaxable Costs
Nontaxable costs are all other costs not specifically enumerated under
§ 1920 and § 1821. Absent “plain evidence of congressional intent to
supersede [these sections],” courts may not award these costs.81 Nontaxable
costs can include modest litigation expenses such as “postage, delivery
services . . . , long distance calls, copy costs, brief binding, copies of
deposition transcripts, costs of investigation, computerized legal research,

74. Section 1821 allows for an attendance fee of forty dollars per day for witnesses in U.S.
courts and further entitles such witnesses to reimbursement for travel and subsistence
expenses. 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (2012).
75. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86 (1991).
76. See infra Part I.B.4.
77. Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 445.
78. See Horace L. Bomar, Jr., Note, The Compensation of Expert Witnesses, 2 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 510, 510 (1935).
79. See id.; infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
80. See infra notes 84–86 and accompanying text.
81. Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 445; see also infra Part I.B.4 (discussing what
constitutes “plain evidence of congressional intent”).
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and travel expenses for witnesses.”82 However, nontaxable costs can also
include more substantial expenses like expert witness fees in copyright
litigation.83 Like lawyers, expert witnesses charge hourly rates.84 A recent
survey estimated that the average fee for an expert is $513 per hour for trial
testimony, $483 per hour for deposition testimony, and $383 per hour for file
review and case preparation.85 If a prevailing party is not entitled to recover
nontaxable costs, that party may only be able to recover an expert’s $40 per
day attendance fee for testifying in a deposition or trial—far less than an
expert’s total fees.86
The Federal Circuit has found that absent statutory authority, a prevailing
party can recover expert witness fees upon a finding of bad faith.87 The
Supreme Court has reaffirmed that federal courts have inherent power to
impose sanctions in the form of an award of costs and attorney’s fees to a
prevailing party in excess of what is provided by statute.88 Such sanctions
are appropriate “when a party has ‘acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly,
or for oppressive reasons.’”89 This standard is very stringent, and thus is not
a reliable method for shifting expert witness fees.90 Therefore, without
sanctionable behavior, statutory authority, or contractual authority, an award
of expert fees likely will not be included in an award of costs.
4. What Is Plain Evidence of Congressional Intent?
In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc.,91 the Supreme Court
explained that although Congress has the power to expand the realm of

82. Michael Northrup, Restrictions on Class-Action Attorney-Fee Awards, 46 S. TEX. L.
REV. 953, 965–66 (2005).
83. See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 709 (2003)
(calling experts the “culprits” for high costs in copyright litigation).
84. TERENCE P. ROSS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: DAMAGES AND REMEDIES § 8.09
(2011).
85. See JAMES J. MANGRAVITI, JR., STEVEN BABITSKY & NADINE NASSER DONOVAN, 2017
SEAK, INC., SURVEY OF EXPERT WITNESS FEES 2 (2017).
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1821(b) (2012).
87. See, e.g., iLOR, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[A]
court can invoke its inherent power to award [expert] fees in exceptional cases based upon a
finding of bad faith.”); Takeda Chem. Indus. v. Mylan Labs., 549 F.3d 1381, 1391 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (“[A] district court may invoke its inherent power to impose sanctions in the form of
reasonable expert fees in excess of what is provided for by statute.”); Amsted Indus. v.
Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 23 F.3d 374, 378 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“[A] trial court can invoke its
inherent sanctioning power to impose expert witness fees in excess of the section 1821(b)
cap.”); Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749, 758 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“28 U.S.C. § 1821 does not limit
the amount of expert witness fees included in awards of attorney fees, even in the absence of
a statute requiring a finding of bad faith or other egregious conduct making a case
‘exceptional.’”).
88. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42, 50 (1991); ROSS, supra note 84,
§ 8.09.
89. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45–46 (quoting Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness
Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975)).
90. See Jay E. Rosenblum, The Appropriate Standard of Review for a Finding of Bad
Faith, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1546, 1550–54 (1992).
91. 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
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recoverable costs, it is not presumed to have done so without “explicit
statutory . . . authorization.”92 Thus, a court may not assess nontaxable costs
against a losing party unless there is “plain evidence of congressional intent
to supersede [§ 1920 and § 1821].”93
In West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,94 the Supreme Court
further clarified that neither the term “attorney’s fee” nor the term “costs”
allows for the shifting of expert fees.95 The statute at issue in West Virginia
University Hospitals, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, did not contain any provision
explicitly referring to costs beyond § 1920 and § 1821 at the time the case
was decided.96 However, just over a week prior to the enactment of § 1988,
several other statutes were enacted that did explicitly permit fee shifting for
expert witness fees.97 Every statute referenced in West Virginia University
Hospitals that was determined to permit the shifting of expert fees
specifically included the word “expert.”98 Accordingly, the Court found that
the statute at issue—which lacked similar language before it was later
amended—did not allow for the recovery of expert witness fees.99
In Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy,100 the
Supreme Court revisited this issue in the context of the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act and made clear that the term “reasonable
attorneys’ fees” also failed to explicitly permit the recovery of expert fees,
even if legislative history supported permitting recovery.101
All fee-shifting provisions in the three key federal acts governing patent,
trademark, and copyright law—enacted in 1790, 1946, and 1976
respectively—lack express language referring to expert witness fees.102
However, in the context of trade secrets, an area of intellectual property
generally governed by state law,103 modern state legislatures have started to

92. See id. at 445.
93. Id.
94. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
95. Id. at 87 n.3, 102.
96. See id.
97. See id. at 88. For example, the Toxic Substances Control Act contained provisions
allowing a prevailing party to recover “costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys and
expert witnesses,” 15 U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2) (1988) (emphasis added); the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act allowed shifting the “costs of litigation (including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees),” 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (1988) (emphasis added); and the
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act allowed shifting the “costs of suit, including reasonable
attorney’s fees and reasonable expert witness fees,” 49 U.S.C. app. § 1686(e) (1988)
(emphasis added). For a nonexhaustive list of thirty-four statutes that explicitly shift
attorney’s fees and expert witness fees, see W. Va. Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 89 n.4.
98. W. Va. Univ. Hosps., 499 U.S. at 89 n.4.
99. Id. at 102. After West Virginia University Hospitals, § 1988(c) was amended to
provide that “[i]n awarding an attorney’s fee . . . , the court, in its discretion, may include
expert fees as part of the attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(c) (2012).
100. 548 U.S. 291 (2006).
101. See id. at 304.
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012); 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012); 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
103. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001–04 (1984). In certain
circumstances, trade secret protection is provided by federal statutes. See, e.g., Freedom of
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expressly allow for the recovery of costs to include expert witness fees where
there is bad faith in trade secret misappropriation claims.104 Still, these
statutes merely mirror existing federal doctrine allowing for an award of
expert fees where a party has engaged in sanctionable behavior.105
C. “Full Costs”
Don’t use words too big for the subject. Don’t say “infinitely” when you
mean “very”; otherwise you’ll have no word left when you want to talk
about something really infinite.
—C. S. Lewis106

Unlike the other intellectual property acts, § 505 of the Copyright Act
ambiguously allows courts to award “full costs.”107 Although this language
is rare in the context of federal fee shifting, it has been used elsewhere in the
U.S. Code.
1. Ambiguity in 17 U.S.C. § 505
Despite the Supreme Court’s seemingly straightforward holdings in
Crawford Fitting, West Virginia University Hospitals, and Murphy,108 the
language of § 505 has continuously led to disparate results among the circuit
courts of appeals.109 One view is that interpreting § 505 as limiting costs to
taxable costs will “read[] the word ‘full’ out of the statute.”110 Accordingly,
nontaxable costs that lie outside the scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1920 may be
awarded to avoid “mak[ing] surplusage of any provision.”111 Still, there is a
strong argument that § 505’s lack of any clear reference to expert witness
fees or other nontaxable costs simply does not constitute clear congressional
intent to treat § 505 costs differently from those in other statutes.112

Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2012); Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–
1832 (2012); Trade Secret Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012).
104. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.4 (2019); N.J. STAT. § 56:15-6 (2018). For example,
section 3426.4 of the California Civil Code provides:
If a claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, a motion to terminate an
injunction is made or resisted in bad faith, or willful and malicious misappropriation
exists, the court may award reasonable attorney’s fees and costs to the prevailing
party. Recoverable costs hereunder shall include a reasonable sum to cover the
services of expert witnesses, who are not regular employees of any party, actually
incurred and reasonably necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial or
arbitration, or during trial or arbitration, of the case by the prevailing party.
105. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text.
106. Letter from C. S. Lewis to Joan (June 26, 1926), in C. S. LEWIS, LETTERS TO CHILDREN
63, 64 (Lyle W. Dorsett & Marjorie Lamp Mead eds., 1985).
107. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012); see also infra Part I.D.
108. See supra Part I.B.4.
109. See infra Part III; see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
110. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 885 (9th Cir.
2005).
111. Id.
112. See Artisan Contractors Ass’n of Am. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 275 F.3d 1038, 1040 (11th
Cir. 2001).
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2. Federal Fee-Shifting Provisions That Allow “Full Costs”
The phrase “full costs” is not unique to § 505. The phrase also appears in
17 U.S.C. § 911(f), 28 U.S.C. § 4001(g), and 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(2)(C) and
605(e)(3)—each a fee-shifting provision that allows for the recovery of full
costs within its statutory framework.113 Unfortunately, courts have not had
occasion to interpret whether 17 U.S.C. § 911(f)114 or 28 U.S.C. § 4001(g)115
provide for nontaxable costs beyond the taxable costs that 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920
and 1821 permit.116 Courts have, however, interpreted 47 U.S.C.
§§ 553(c)(2)(C) and 605(e)(3).
47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C)—which applies to disputes involving the
unauthorized reception of cable service—provides that courts may “direct the
recovery of full costs, including awarding reasonable attorneys’ fees to an
aggrieved party who prevails.” Courts have found that full costs in these
cases can include investigative costs117—costs beyond what 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920 contemplates.118 Investigative costs have been awarded to a
prevailing party under this statute where the plaintiffs were forced to incur a
substantial cost to hire an investigative agency to stop a debtor from causing
harm, which was itself an injury.119
47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)—which applies to disputes involving unauthorized
publication or use of communications—provides that when a person
aggrieved by a violation of subsection (a) of the statute brings a civil action,
the court “shall direct the recovery of full costs, including awarding
reasonable attorneys’ fees to an aggrieved party who prevails.” Like
47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C), courts have discretion to allow for recovery of

113. 17 U.S.C. § 911(f) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 4001(g) (2012); 47 U.S.C. §§ 553(c)(2)(C),
605(e)(3) (2012).
114. 17 U.S.C. § 911(f) provides that “[i]n any civil action arising under . . . chapter [9],
the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs, including reasonable attorneys’
fees, to the prevailing party” in disputes involving mask work fixed in semiconductor chip
products. The Federal Circuit found this section to be “commensurate with 17 U.S.C. § 505
of the copyright statute.” Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555,
1582 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 4001(g) provides that “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery
of full costs by or against any party and may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the
prevailing party as part of the costs” in disputes arising from contractual obligations related to
transfers of rights in motion pictures.
116. As of February 5, 2019, research has not identified any cases discussing the “full
costs” language in these statutes.
117. See, e.g., CSC Holdings, Inc. v. KDE Elecs. Corp., No. 99 C 1556, 2000 WL 284005,
at *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2000); Time Warner Entm’t/Advance-Newhouse P’ship v. Worldwide
Elecs., L.C., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1288, 1302 (S.D. Fla. 1999). Interestingly, the decision in CSC
Holdings was based on precedent developed before the Supreme Court’s mandate in Crawford
Fitting, which requires explicit statutory authority to permit costs beyond those enumerated in
28 U.S.C. § 1920. See CSC Holdings, 2000 WL 284005, at *6 (relying on Time Warner for
the proposition that full costs may include investigative costs); Time Warner, 50 F. Supp. 2d
at 1302 (relying on In re Cohen, 121 B.R. 267, 269 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990) for the proposition
that full costs may include investigative costs).
118. See supra notes 73–74.
119. In re Cohen, 121 B.R. 267, 272 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990).
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investigative costs.120 One court held that the legislative history of the
underlying statute provides the basis for allowing recovery of investigative
fees by confirming that a court’s “power to direct the recovery of all costs
under § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) shall include reasonable investigative fees (related
to the action) of an aggrieved party.”121
D. Fee Shifting in Other Areas of Intellectual Property Law
The Lanham Act—also known as the Trademark Act of 1946—governs
trademarks, service marks, and unfair competition.122 The Lanham Act’s
fee-shifting provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), provides that “[w]hen a violation
of any right of the registrant of a mark . . . shall have been established in any
civil action arising under [the Act], the plaintiff shall be entitled . . . to
recover . . . the costs of the action.”123 Although costs are mandatory under
the Lanham Act,124 they are only awarded to prevailing plaintiffs and are
limited to costs defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.125 Section 1117(a) does not
expressly mention the shifting of expert fees,126 and the Second Circuit has
noted in dicta that expert witness fees are not included in an award of costs
under the Lanham Act.127
The Patent Act governs patents and the rights associated with them.128 The
Patent Act’s fee-shifting provision for costs, 35 U.S.C. § 284, provides that
“the court shall award the claimant damages . . . together with interest and
costs as fixed by the court.”129 Like the Lanham Act, costs are only awarded
to prevailing plaintiffs, and these costs are limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1920.130

120. See, e.g., Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Autar, 426 F. Supp. 2d 59, 67 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (finding that § 605(e)(3)(B)(iii) implies that reasonable attorneys’ fees are included in
full costs, which suggests that full costs may exceed the taxable costs recoverable under
28 U.S.C. § 1920); Int’l Cablevision, Inc. v. Noel, 982 F. Supp. 904, 918 (W.D.N.Y. 1997)
(noting that the legislative history of the Cable Communications Policy Act contemplates and
permits the recovery of reasonable investigative fees in the recovery of all costs). Even though
awarding full costs is mandatory under § 605(e)(3), the legislative history of this statute
instructs courts that awarding investigative fees is permissive. See Kingvision, 426 F. Supp. 2d
at 67.
121. Int’l Cablevision, 982 F. Supp. at 917.
122. See generally Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072, 1091–1096, 1111–1129, 1141–1141n (2012)).
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012).
124. See Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (2016) (“When
a statute distinguishes between ‘may’ and ‘shall,’ it is generally clear that ‘shall’ imposes a
mandatory duty.”).
125. See, e.g., Uphoff v. Elegant Bath, Ltd., 176 F.3d 399, 411 (7th Cir. 1999); Zeltiq
Aesthetics, Inc. v. Brown Health Relaxation Station LLC, No. 13-C-575, 2014 WL 1818154,
at *5 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 2014).
126. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
127. Merck Eprova AG v. Gnosis S.p.A., 760 F.3d 247, 266 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining that
the district court clearly exceeded its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1821 by awarding expert
witness fees).
128. See generally Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C.
§§ 1–42, 100–212, 251–329, 351–376, 381–390 (2012)).
129. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
130. See Parks v. Booth, 102 U.S. 96, 106 (1880).
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Further, such costs are mandatory.131 Section 284 also does not expressly
mention shifting expert fees.132 In light of this, courts have uniformly held
that the Patent Act does not authorize the prevailing party in a patent suit to
recover its expert witness fees.133
Accordingly, both the Lanham Act and Patent Act differ from the
Copyright Act regarding fee shifting. First, neither act allows prevailing
defendants to recover costs, whereas the Copyright Act allows for fee shifting
regardless of which side prevails.134 Second, both the Lanham and Patent
Acts use mandatory language regarding fee shifting of costs, whereas the
Copyright Act does not.135 Third, neither the Lanham Act nor the Patent Act
authorizes a prevailing party to recover its expert witness fees, which stands
in contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the Copyright Act that a
prevailing party may recover its expert witness fees.136
II. AMBIGUOUS COPYRIGHT LAW AND POTENTIAL REMEDIES
The 1976 Act contains several ambiguous provisions that present
challenges for potential copyright infringement litigants. Although these
challenges may increase the cost of undertaking successful copyright
litigation, there are potential remedies that allow litigants to circumvent these
challenges. Part II.A discusses the ambiguity of the Copyright Act and the
inherent need for experts in copyright litigation. Part II.B examines some
alternative remedies for costly copyright litigation.
A. Understanding the Copyright Act
Copyright law considers a copyright owner’s reward to be a “secondary
consideration” to the benefits the public gleans from that author’s work.137
Allowing copyright holders to exclude others from producing or selling a
holder’s work allows the public to benefit from the work.138 Rewarding
authors in such a way induces them to release their work to the public.139 To
effectuate this incentive, copyright law has been shaped to comply with a
wide range of complex fact patterns so that courts may reach equitable
results.140

131. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
132. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012).
133. See, e.g., Genes Indus. v. Custom Blinds & Components, Inc., No. SACV 15-0476
AG (Ex), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21879, at *20 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2018); BIC Leisure Prods.
v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 224, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
134. See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 201–02 and accompanying text.
137. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,
116 YALE L.J. 882, 885 (2007).
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1. Copyright Law Is Ambiguous
To address a variety of complex fact patterns, copyright doctrines are
inherently ambiguous.141 Copyright’s fair use defense, for example, which
requires the application of four interdependent and nonexclusive factors,142
is “famously ambiguous” with over a century and a half of case law having
analyzed it.143 Further, although copyright protects an author’s expression,
more abstract ideas remain uncopyrightable, and the dividing line between
these two concepts is murky.144 The “substantial similarity” standard, which
permits copying in certain contexts, does not provide a clear threshold for
what comprises excessive copying.145
In light of these ambiguous doctrines, the risk of misinterpreting what
copyright does and does not protect can be substantial.146 New creative
works may require significant investment up front with no profit until
completion of the work.147 An error leading to copyright liability could delay
or destroy that entire investment.148 Accordingly, decision makers are
encouraged to be more risk averse.149 The more money involved in a project,
the greater the need for prophylactic measures, which have their own
costs.150
2. Expert Testimony Is Often Vital in Copyright Litigation
Intellectual property litigation can become expensive.151 Expert witnesses
are typically required to explain complex concepts such as consumer surveys
and the likelihood of confusion in trademark cases, relevant technologies in
patent cases, and issues of substantial similarity in copyright cases.152
Although copyright cases concerning publishing and entertainment can often
be resolved without experts, battles of experts have become increasingly
more common as copyright litigation spreads to computers and
multimedia.153
Recently, in Williams v. Gaye,154 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict
finding that Pharrell Williams and Robin Thicke’s song “Blurred Lines”
unlawfully infringed on Marvin Gaye’s copyright to the song “Got to Give It
141. See generally id. (describing various copyright doctrines that lead to ambiguity within
copyright law).
142. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
143. Gibson, supra note 140, at 889–90.
144. See id. at 891.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 890.
147. Id. at 891.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 892.
150. See id. at 892–93.
151. 4 JAY DRATLER, JR. & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
COMMERCIAL, CREATIVE, AND INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY § 12.06 n.166 (2013).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 885 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2018).

1738

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

Up.”155 Expert witnesses played a significant role in securing the verdict for
Marvin Gaye’s estate.156 Judge Jacqueline Nguyen dissented and seemed to
suggest that where a court has little expertise on a subject and the opposing
parties’ experts’ opinions are so “starkly different,” a court should ignore the
parties’ experts and instead appoint its own.157 Regardless of the propriety
of Judge Nguyen’s suggestion, this case illustrates the significant role that
expert witnesses play in copyright infringement cases.
In Fox News Network v. TVEyes, Inc.,158 the Second Circuit, too, recently
demonstrated the significant role expert testimony can play in determining
whether an infringement has taken place.159 The court’s consideration of
market harm—arguably “the single most important element of fair use”160—
played a critical role in securing a verdict for Fox.161
Moreover, after attorney’s fees, expert witness fees are the second-highest
However, no federal
expense in intellectual property litigation.162
intellectual property legislation explicitly grants courts the authority to shift
expert fees.163 Nonetheless, expert fees contribute enormously to litigation
costs, which in turn inform settlement decisions.164 Direct proof of copying
is generally not available, so plaintiffs are often required to utilize expert
testimony to establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement.165
Further, expert testimony may also be crucial to establish actual damages and
recoverable profits.166 Barring recovery of expert fees may disincentivize
plaintiffs from protecting their copyrights, especially as the costs approach
the threshold of potential recovery.167 Defendants, too, may be strong-armed
into settlement to avoid the expert fees required to rebut a plaintiff’s prima
facie case.168
The need for expert testimony to determine whether actual copying has
taken place can arise in several situations. For example, expert testimony
can greatly assist a lay juror in understanding what elements of a song are

155. Id. at 1182–83.
156. See id. at 1187–94 (Nguyen, J., dissenting). The experts articulated the alleged
similarities in melody, shared hook phrases, a four-note melodic sequence called “Theme X,”
word painting, and similar chords and rhythms among the keyboard parts and bass line. Id.
157. See id. at 1197 n.15 (pointing to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which
allows courts to appoint their own experts).
158. 883 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2018).
159. Id. at 179–80.
160. Id. at 179 (quoting Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
566 (1985)).
161. See id. at 180.
162. Anne Brody & Natalie Dygert, Shifting Expert Fees in Intellectual Property
Litigation, 18 ASS’N BUS. TRIAL LAW. REP. ORANGE COUNTY, Summer 2016, at 3, 3.
163. See supra Part I.D. Even the more recent Defend Trade Secrets Act, enacted in 2016,
does not mention expert fees. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3) (Supp. V 2018).
164. Brody & Dygert, supra note 162, at 11.
165. Trigg, Brock & Pequignot, supra note 5, at 13.
166. Id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
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sufficiently original to warrant copyright protection.169 Expert testimony
may be a necessity in cases involving complex computer programs, which
are generally beyond the everyday knowledge of a lay juror.170 Another
example is the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act,171 where the Senate
report stressed the importance of using expert testimony in determining
substantial similarity.172 This reliance on expert testimony constitutes a
significant shift from conventional copyright law.173 Still, several courts
have made clear that expert testimony was not appropriate in certain
contexts.174
Nonetheless, since the enactment of the 1976 Act, expert testimony has
become increasingly useful in copyright infringement cases in potentially
unforeseen ways. The concept of “works of authorship”—which allows
courts to protect works not expressly included in the enumerated categories
of copyrightable works under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)175—was intentionally left
vague under the 1976 Act.176 The scope of works covered by copyright law
has continued to expand into new domains, such as computers and
multimedia,177 thus increasing the requirement for experts.178

169. Miah Rosenberg, Note, Do You Hear What I Hear? Expert Testimony in Music
Infringement Cases in the Ninth Circuit, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1669, 1682 (2006).
170. Aaron M. Broaddus, Eliminating the Confusion: A Restatement of the Test for
Copyright Infringement, 5 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 43, 67 n.144 (1995).
171. Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335 (1984) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901–
914 (2012)).
172. See S. REP. NO. 98-1201, at 145–46 (1983) (“I . . . hope that the legislative history of
S. 1201 would include a statement endorsing use of expert testimony to show subtle functional
differences in circuit layouts.”); Richard H. Stern, Determining Liability for Infringement of
Mask Work Rights Under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act, 70 MINN. L. REV. 271, 300
(1985).
173. Stern, supra note 172, at 300 n.98.
174. See, e.g., Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 295 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding
that expert testimony was not needed to compare two literary works aimed at a general
audience to determine substantial similarity); Soptra Fabrics Corp. v. Stafford Knitting Mills,
Inc., 490 F.2d 1092, 1093 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that the underlying test for infringement of
fabric design is “whether an average lay observer would find a substantial similarity in the
designs” (quoting Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros. Textile Corp., 409 F.2d 1315, 1316
(2d Cir. 1969))); Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 989 F. Supp. 2d 96, 103–04 (D.D.C. 2013)
(holding that no expert testimony is needed to determine whether architectural works are
substantially similar).
175. Under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), works of authorship include “(1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying
music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works;
(6) motion pictures and other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural
works.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
176. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976) (“The phrase ‘original works of authorship[]’ . . .
is purposely left undefined.”).
177. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
178. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992)
(“[W]e leave it to the discretion of the district court to decide to what extent, if any, expert
opinion, regarding the highly technical nature of computer programs, is warranted in a given
case.”); Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232–33 (3d Cir.
1986) (endorsing the use of expert testimony for determining copyright infringement of
computer software).
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B. Current Remedies for Costly Copyright Litigation
Apart from shifting expert fees, there are several alternate methods that
help circumvent the daunting prospect of costly copyright litigation,
including settlement, offers of judgment under Rule 68 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
In general, civil cases rarely reach a stage where judgment is entered
against a party.179 In copyright cases, however, judgments entered against a
party are comparatively more common.180 Nonetheless, ambiguity in
copyright law can generate risk-averse behavior that motivates settlement.181
Where there are hazy legal situations, settlements allow parties to protect
themselves from a copyright owner who may obtain a judgment granting
himself all available remedies.182 Because copyright disputes may be well
suited for nonlitigation dispute resolution due to parties’ interests in avoiding
uncertain and costly copyright litigation, a culture of settlement may be
developing within the copyright arena.183 Such a culture can foster a chilling
effect184 among copyright users because they may be subject to costs they
could have avoided if the matter had been litigated.185 Thus, dispute
settlement essentially can raise the costs of using copyrighted works and
create an incentive to pay for a use of work when there is no legal obligation
to do so.186
Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure helps defendants reduce
potential fee exposure for frivolous claims that plaintiffs bring.187 To
accomplish this, it provides a mechanism to help defendants encourage
settlement. Under Rule 68(d), “[i]f the judgment that the offeree finally
obtains is not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, the offeree must pay

179. From January 1, 2009, to January 1, 2019, statistics show that a judgment is entered
for a plaintiff or defendant in roughly 9 percent of total district court cases. Statistics
Regarding Case Resolutions, LEX MACHINA, https://law.lexmachina.com (follow “Cases”
hyperlink; then select “Case Resolutions” tab). More specifically, judgment was entered for
a plaintiff 5 percent of the time, and judgment was entered for a defendant 4 percent of the
time. Id.
180. From January 1, 2009, to January 1, 2019, statistics show that in roughly 13 percent
of copyright cases (and intellectual property in general), judgment was entered for a plaintiff
or defendant. Id. (follow “Cases” hyperlink; then under “Filter” select “Case Types”
dropdown menu and select “Copyright”; then select “Case Resolutions” tab). More
specifically, judgment was entered for a plaintiff roughly 12 percent of the time, and judgment
was entered for a defendant roughly 1 percent of the time. Id.
181. Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in
Copyright Law, 29 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 17 (2011).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 18 & n.74.
184. A chilling effect results where “potential uses of copyrighted works are avoided
because of the lack of clarity regarding the legal status of the uses in question.” Id. at 5.
185. Id. at 18.
186. Id. at 45.
187. See, e.g., McGraw-Hill Glob. Educ., LLC v. Jones, 714 F. App’x 500, 504 (6th Cir.
2017) (recognizing that Rule 68 allows a defendant to make a nonnegotiable offer of judgment
consisting of costs and attorney’s fees).
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the costs incurred after the offer was made.”188 So long as the offer does not
explicitly exclude costs, Rule 68 allows defendants to make a nonnegotiable
offer of judgment.189 Unlike standard settlement negotiations where a
plaintiff may provide a counteroffer, plaintiffs faced with a Rule 68 offer may
only accept or decline the offer.190 Rule 68 thus provides a neutral means
for encouraging settlement of all lawsuits without favoring either party.191
Where liability is settled but damages have yet to be calculated, a
mandatory grant of costs and fees may deter defendants from fighting
plaintiffs who demand unreasonable damages.192 Rule 68 provides this
mandatory award of costs and fees. Granting mandatory costs and fees also
can allow defendants to ward off claims by copyright holders seeking
damages not recognized by law.193 To draw attention to the neutral benefits
of Rule 68 for encouraging settlement, one commentator has suggested
adding a provision to § 505 that states that neither party is prevailing when
the judgment the plaintiff ultimately obtains is not more favorable than the
unaccepted offer.194
Under Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, sanctions are
authorized where it is determined that a claim has an insufficient legal or
factual basis or it is brought for an improper purpose.195 Rule 11 sanctions
thus provide a procedural tactic to help combat baseless and frivolous
copyright litigation. In Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications
Enterprises,196 the Supreme Court upheld Rule 11 sanctions and made clear
“that the central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings in district court
and thus . . . streamline the administration and procedure of the federal
courts.”197 Therefore, Rule 11 sanctions potentially offer another avenue for
a prevailing party to recover expert witness fees outside of § 505.198
III. DIVERGING INTERPRETATIONS OF “FULL COSTS”
The circuit courts are in conflict regarding the scope of costs that may be
awarded to prevailing parties under § 505.199 Whether expert witness fees

188. FED. R. CIV. P. 68(d).
189. Util. Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec. Coop., 298 F.3d 1238, 1240
(11th Cir. 2002).
190. Id.
191. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985).
192. John Tehranian, Curbing Copyblight, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 993, 1024 n.216
(2012).
193. See id. at 1023–24.
194. Id. at 1031 (proposing an amended version of § 505 to add that “when a defendant
makes an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and the plaintiff rejects
said offer of judgment and ultimately receives a judgment not more favorable than the
unaccepted offer of judgment, no party will be considered prevailing”).
195. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c).
196. 498 U.S. 533 (1991).
197. Id. at 552 (quoting Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990)).
198. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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are recoverable as full costs implicates several of the copyright law issues
discussed in Part II.
Fee shifting can have significant consequences when courts are given wide
discretion when awarding costs to a prevailing party. In a recent case, Oracle
USA, Inc. v. Rimini Street, Inc.,200 the judgment awarded to the prevailing
party included an additional $12 million in costs because it was brought in a
circuit that awards nontaxable costs beyond those enumerated in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1920.201 These nontaxable costs included expert witness fees, certain
e-discovery fees, contract-attorney services, and jury consulting, among
other costs.202 Thus, the level of discretion a court has to award costs can be
the difference between a party recovering nontaxable costs in the tens of
millions of dollars or no nontaxable costs at all.
The circuit courts are divided on whether the Copyright Act’s allowance
for recovery of “full costs” overrides the restriction on cost awards that
§ 1920 and § 1821 provide. The Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have found
§ 505 to be limited to the categories expressly identified in § 1920.203 In
contrast, the First, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have awarded
nontaxable costs in copyright cases.204 Through Crawford Fitting, West
Virginia University Hospitals, and Murphy, the Supreme Court has
consistently narrowed the language that allows awards of costs beyond
§ 1920 and § 1821,205 yet the Court has not addressed whether the language
“full costs” also fails to permit an award of expert fees.206
200. 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018).
201. See id. at 965–66. The District Court of Nevada awarded attorney’s fees and costs in
favor of Oracle USA in the amount of $46,227,363.36. Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc.,
209 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1219 (D. Nev. 2016), aff’d, 879 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,
139 S. Ct. 52 (argued Jan. 14, 2019) (No. 17-1625). Of the award, $12,774,550.26 constituted
nontaxable costs. Id.
202. Oracle USA, 209 F. Supp. 3d at 1218.
203. See Artisan Contractors Ass’n of Am. v. Frontier Ins. Co., 275 F.3d 1038, 1040 (11th
Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (noting that “Section 505 makes no clear reference to witness fees,
nor otherwise evinces a clear congressional intent to supercede [sic] the limitations imposed”
by Congress’s cost-shifting regime); Pinkham v. Camex, Inc., 84 F.3d 292, 295 (8th Cir. 1996)
(per curiam) (holding that “full costs” does not “‘clearly,’ ‘explicitly,’ or ‘plainly’ evidence[]
congressional intent to treat 17 U.S.C. § 505 costs differently from costs authorized in other
statutes”).
204. See Oracle USA, 879 F.3d at 966 (affirming an award for over $12 million in
nontaxable costs); InvesSys, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Cos., 369 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2004)
(holding that costs of electronic legal research are reimbursable under § 505); Coles v.
Wonder, 283 F.3d 798, 803–04 (6th Cir. 2002) (affirming an award of over $14,000 in
nontaxable costs); Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v. Ashton-Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 458 (7th
Cir. 2001) (holding that an award of nontaxable costs is permissible under § 505 and that
§ 1920 does not limit the award).
205. See supra Part I.B.4.
206. The Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari in the Oracle USA case.
Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 52 (Sept. 27, 2018) (No. 17-1625). The
issue on review is “[w]hether the Copyright Act’s allowance of ‘full costs’ (17 U.S.C. § 505)
to a prevailing party is limited to taxable costs under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1821, as the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have held, or also authorizes nontaxable costs, as the Ninth
Circuit holds.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Rimini Street, 139 S. Ct. 52 (Sept. 27, 2018)
(No. 17-1625).
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Circuit courts that have not awarded nontaxable costs under § 505 have
found that the word “full” does not expressly authorize such costs.207 Under
Crawford Fitting and its progeny, these courts have determined that the “full
costs” language does not evince congressional intent to treat § 505 costs
differently from other costs, especially absent legislative authority discussing
the source of the term “full costs.”208 Instead, “full costs” may be viewed as
an indication that any taxable costs available under federal law are available
in full at the discretion of the court.209 Thus, the term’s ambiguity may not
establish clear evidence of congressional intent to supersede § 1920 and
§ 1821.210
Circuit courts that have awarded nontaxable costs under § 505 have found
that the word “full” does constitute congressional intent to make nontaxable
costs available to prevailing parties.211 Under this view, to hold otherwise
may “violate the long standing principle of statute interpretation that ‘statutes
should not be construed to make surplusage of any provision.’”212 Thus,
failing to award costs beyond the limitations of § 1920 and § 1821 would
render the word “full” meaningless.213 Further, certain nontaxable costs that
are considered disbursements made by an attorney and billed directly to the
client, such as computer-assisted research, may be encompassed by the
phrase “attorney’s fee.”214
Allowing nontaxable costs to be awarded in copyright cases constitutes
substantial fee shifting, with awards of nontaxable costs potentially reaching
tens of millions of dollars.215 Thus, litigants in circuits that do not award
nontaxable costs avoid the threat of these considerable cost awards in
copyright cases.

207. See, e.g., Artisan Contractors, 275 F.3d at 1040; Pinkham, 84 F.3d at 295.
208. See Pinkham, 84 F.3d at 295.
209. Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v. Lessard Design, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 503,
525 (E.D. Va. 2015) (“Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s presupposition, the term ‘full’ has
another possible, non-superfluous meaning; it could refer to the degree of costs recoverable
under §§ 1821 and 1920.”).
210. Id.
211. See, e.g., Oracle USA, Inc. v. Rimini St., Inc., 879 F.3d 948, 965–66 (9th Cir. 2018),
cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 52 (argued Jan. 14, 2019) (No. 17-1625); InvesSys, Inc. v. McGrawHill Cos., 369 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2004).
212. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Entm’t Distrib., 429 F.3d 869, 885 (9th Cir.
2005) (quoting Nw. Forest Res. Council v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 825, 834 (9th Cir. 1996)).
213. Id. But see Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568 U.S. 371, 385 (2013) (“[R]edundancy
is ‘hardly unusual’ in statutes addressing costs.” (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship,
564 U.S. 91, 107 (2011))).
214. InvesSys, 369 F.3d at 22 (citing W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 87
n.3 (1991)).
215. See, e.g., Oracle USA, 879 F.3d at 966 (awarding over $12 million in nontaxable
costs); Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., No. CV 04-9049 DOC (RNBx), 2011 WL 3420603,
at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2011) (awarding $31,667,104 in nontaxable costs), aff’d, 705 F.3d
1108 (9th Cir. 2013).
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IV. SECTION 505 DOES NOT ALLOW FEE SHIFTING OF
EXPERT WITNESS FEES, BUT IT SHOULD
This Note argues that expert fees should be awarded to prevailing parties
in copyright litigation at the discretion of the court. First, Part IV.A
concludes that the current language of 17 U.S.C. § 505 does not allow for the
shifting of expert fees to prevailing parties. Next, Part IV.B argues that
Congress nonetheless should amend § 505 to allow for awards of expert fees
given the inherent need for experts in copyright litigation.
Giving courts discretion to award expert fees in copyright infringement
cases is beneficial to both copyright holders and users. Without this
discretion, potential copyright litigants will be deterred from litigating
meritorious copyright claims and defenses. This would harm a central
objective of copyright law—to protect not only the rights of creators, but also
the public’s access to creative works.216 Thus, allowing for recovery of
expert fees in appropriate cases will address this concern in cases with
ambiguous facts and law.
A. Section 505 Does Not Allow for Shifting of Expert Fees
On its face, § 505 does not expressly allow for courts to shift nontaxable
costs beyond § 1920 and § 1821. If Congress seeks to encourage the shifting
of expert witness fees in particular, the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Crawford Fitting, West Virginia University Hospitals, and Murphy illustrate
exactly what is required—the word “expert.”217 Section 505 lacks this
word.218
As the Supreme Court pointed out in West Virginia University Hospitals,
Congress passed several acts and amendments in 1976 that included feeshifting provisions expressly referring to expert fees.219 That same Congress
passed the Copyright Act of 1976, and it was capable of using similar
language in § 505.220 The 1976 Act generally amended the entirety of the
Copyright Act of 1909,221 and it included several significant revisions to
§ 505.222 Namely, the 1976 Act made an award of costs to the prevailing
party no longer mandatory, and it instead provided that they should be
granted at the discretion of the court.223 However, expert fees were never
mentioned.224
216. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
217. See supra Part I.B.4 (discussing the type of language that will evince clear
congressional intent to supersede § 1920 and § 1821).
218. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012).
219. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
220. However, possibly due to unforeseen changes in copyright law, Congress at that time
may have been unaware of a growing need for experts in copyright infringement litigation.
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
221. See generally Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–810 (2012)).
222. See supra Part I.A.2.
223. See supra notes 51–54 and accompanying text.
224. See generally Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.
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There is evidence that courts shift costs beyond § 1920 and § 1821 under
statutes that use the language “full costs.”225 However, these statutes hardly
provide substantial authority that “full costs” meets the requisite explicit
statutory authorization for allowing the shifting of expert fees that Crawford
Fitting, West Virginia University Hospitals, and Murphy contemplate. First,
the appellate cases that interpret these statutes do not reference any of these
Supreme Court decisions in deciding whether the language “full costs”
allows for nontaxable costs beyond § 1920 and § 1821.226 Second, the ranges
of costs these statutes permit were never contemplated beyond the trial court
level.227
Third, the logic allowing for nontaxable costs in these cases is shaky. For
example, one case relies on a line of precedent predating the Supreme Court’s
mandate in Crawford Fitting, which required explicit statutory authority for
the recovery of costs beyond § 1920 and § 1821.228 Another case based its
interpretation on two theories: that the term “full costs” in 47 U.S.C. § 605
includes reasonable attorneys’ fees in context, and that legislative history
suggests it was the intent of one senator that parties be able to recover
reasonable investigative fees in their recovery of costs.229
However, these two rationales directly contravene Supreme Court
precedent. Murphy explained that where a “reasonable attorney’s fee” was
part of the costs permitted to be shifted, this still did not permit courts to shift
costs beyond § 1920 and § 1821, even if legislative history may have
provided some notice that such nontaxable costs were permitted.230 Another
case failed to reference Crawford Fitting or West Virginia University
Hospitals in guiding whether an award of investigative fees was permissible,
despite being decided several years after these two Supreme Court
decisions.231
B. Congress Should Amend § 505 to Allow for Shifting of Expert Fees
The need for experts in copyright litigation,232 coupled with the exorbitant
costs of expert testimony that may be required to establish or rebut a prima
facie case of infringement,233 justify a fee-shifting statute under the
225. See supra Part I.C.2.
226. See generally Kingvision Pay-Per-View Ltd. v. Autar, 426 F. Supp. 2d 59 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)); CSC Holdings, Inc. v. KDE Elecs. Corp., No. 99 C
1556, 2000 WL 284005 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 13, 2000) (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C)); Time
Warner Entm’t/Advance-Newhouse P’ship v. Worldwide Elecs., L.C., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1288
(S.D. Fla. 1999) (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2)(C)); Int’l Cablevision, Inc. v. Noel, 982 F.
Supp. 904 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing 47 U.S.C. § 605(e)(3)).
227. As of February 5, 2019, research has not identified any appellate cases discussing
these statutes.
228. See supra note 117.
229. See supra notes 120–21 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
231. See generally Int’l Cablevision, 982 F. Supp. 904 (failing to cite relevant Supreme
Court precedent).
232. See supra notes 165–74 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 84–86, 162, 165, 168 and accompanying text.
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Copyright Act that permits courts to award expert fees to a prevailing party
in the court’s discretion.
Since § 505 was last amended in 1976, the range of works deemed
copyrightable has grown, which in turn has led to an increased use of
experts.234 In many cases, expert testimony is the primary tool for
determining whether copying has taken place at all.235 Without it, plaintiffs
may not be able to establish a prima facie case of copyright infringement.236
Where the costs of litigation can substantially outweigh potential
damages,237 plaintiffs will be precluded from bringing meritorious copyright
claims without the possibility of recovering these exorbitant costs. Similarly,
defendants may be precluded from bringing meritorious defenses where
substantial litigation costs involving experts outweigh continued use of the
allegedly copied authorship. Although Rule 68 may provide a mechanism
for encouraging settlement so that defendants can avoid fighting demands for
unreasonable damages, it is unclear how effective Rule 68 is when liability,
rather than damages, has yet to be determined.238 Accordingly, the
possibility of recovering expert costs removes a substantial barrier that may
prevent litigants from bringing meritorious claims or defenses.239 This helps
to avoid a culture of settlement that discourages copyright users from
litigating potentially meritorious claims so they are not burdened by
avoidable costs.240
Although federal courts already shift expert fees in cases where the
opposing litigant has “acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for
oppressive reasons,”241 the needs of copyright litigants call for a broader
allowance of expert fee shifting.242 Copyright law must balance a creator’s
property rights and the public’s access to a work, and allowing a litigant’s
capacity to afford experts to dictate whether they may successfully bring
meritorious claims or defenses would upset this balance.243 Meritorious
copyright claims protect not only the litigant bringing those claims but also
the public’s access to knowledge.244 Accordingly, meritorious copyright
litigants should be compensated for protecting a right that benefits the public
in addition to their own copyrights.245
Of course, to mirror Congress’s decision to make awards of costs
permissive under the 1976 Act,246 courts should still be afforded discretion
234. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 165–74 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 165, 168 and accompanying text.
237. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 188–90 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 4, 165, 168–74 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 183–86 and accompanying text.
241. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45–46 (1991) (quoting Alyeska Pipeline
Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975)).
242. See supra notes 165–74 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
244. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
246. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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in whether to allow a prevailing party to recover expert fees. Making awards
permissive rather than mandatory recognizes that copyright law is often
ambiguous.247 Where there is ambiguity in the law, parties are encouraged
to engage in risk-averse prophylactic tactics to mitigate their potential
liability.248 Instituting a mandatory requirement for shifting of costs,
attorney’s fees, or expert fees would unduly punish parties that bring
objectively rational, but losing, claims or defenses to court.
Accordingly, § 505 should be amended as follows:
In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the
recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the United States
or an officer thereof. Except as otherwise provided by this title, the court
may also award a reasonable attorney’s fee and reasonable expert witness
fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs.

The word “reasonable” instructs courts to be wary of awarding the entirety
of expert fees to a prevailing party, and it acknowledges that ex post review
may reveal that the costs incurred may outweigh the costs necessary for the
particular case.249 Further, it recognizes that courts may have to circumvent
some of the anxieties that accompany a system where the loser pays.250
Prevailing litigants should not be entitled to expert witness fees that are
deemed to be unrestrained or abusive to the opposing party.251
CONCLUSION
This proposal acknowledges that the power to make law regarding fee
shifting should rest with Congress. Although some courts have interpreted
“full costs” to be ambiguous with respect to whether Congress intended for
prevailing parties under the Copyright Act to recover costs beyond those
normally permitted, the Supreme Court’s holdings in Crawford Fitting, West
Virginia University Hospitals, and Murphy make clear that courts may not
allow prevailing parties to recover expert witness fees without the magic
words: “expert witness fees.”
Nonetheless, Congress should amend 17 U.S.C. § 505 to allow for the
recovery of expert witness fees. Copyright law incentivizes the creation of
unique authorships that are ultimately intended for the public to enjoy. A
litigant’s own copyright claim is one from which the public can benefit.
Allowing parties with deeper pockets to dictate what copyright does and does
not protect is against the public’s interest. Accordingly, a fee-shifting statute
that expressly allows for the recovery of expert witness fees helps to maintain
the equilibrium between a creator’s property rights and the public’s access to
a work.

247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra notes 146–50 and accompanying text.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 15, 22 and accompanying text.
See supra note 22 and accompanying text.

